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The Putin doctrine: 
The formation of a conceptual framework for Russian 
dominance in the post-Soviet area
Marek Menkiszak
The statements made in recent weeks by Russian officials, and especially President Vladimir 
Putin, in connection with Moscow’s policy towards Ukraine, may suggest that the emergence 
of a certain doctrine of Russian foreign and security policy is at hand, especially in relation 
to the post-Soviet area. Most of the arguments at the core of this doctrine are not new, but 
recently they have been formulated more openly and in more radical terms. Those arguments 
concern the role of Russia as the defender of Russian-speaking communities abroad and 
the guarantor of their rights, as well as specifically understood good neighbourly relations 
(meaning in fact limited sovereignty) as a precondition that must be met in order for Moscow 
to recognise the independence and territorial integrity of post-Soviet states. However, the 
new doctrine also includes arguments which have not been raised before, or have hither-
to only been formulated on rare occasions, and which may indicate the future evolution of 
Russia’s policy. Specifically, this refers to Russia’s use of extralegal categories, such as national 
interest, truth and justice, to justify its policy, and its recognition of military force as a legiti-
mate instrument to defend its compatriots abroad. 
This doctrine is effectively an outline of the conceptual foundation for Russian dominance in the 
post-Soviet area. It offers a justification for the efforts to restore the unity of the ‘Russian nation’ 
(or more broadly, the Russian-speaking community), within a bloc pursuing close integration (the 
Eurasian Economic Union), or even within a single state encompassing at least parts of that area. 
As such, it poses a challenge for the West, which Moscow sees as the main opponent of Russia’s 
plans to build a new order in Europe (Eurasia) that would undermine the post-Cold War order. 
I. Diagnosis of the situation 
1. Russia as the centre of the Russian World
The starting point of Putin’s doctrine lies in 
a certain view of the world, which presupposes 
the existence of a natural civilisational commu-
nity, with Russia at the centre. That communi-
ty takes the form of concentric circles, the first 
one of which is based on the close ties first 
and foremost between Russia and Ukraine, 
and secondly also with Belarus. President 
Putin has repeatedly underlined the exception-
al nature of Russian-Ukrainian relations. For 
instance, in an address delivered on 18 March 
2014, he explained the Russian “spiritual suffer-
ing” in connection with Ukraine by saying “we 
are one people (…) and we cannot live without 
each other”1. 
1 The word ‘nation’ (‘narod’) as used by Putin has multiple 
meanings – it signifies the people, but also a nation in 
a political, rather than ethnic, sense. Putin’s address to 
the Federal Assembly, 18 March 2014, http://eng.krem-
lin.ru/news/6889 [further in this text: Putin, 18 March]. 
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Earlier, in September 2013, he told the Valdai 
Club that the Russian unity also included Belarus, 
and formed a special ‘three-part Russian nation’2. 
On another occasion, speaking about the three 
nations, the Russian President even declared: 
“Essentially, we have a common church, a com-
mon spiritual source, and a common destiny”3. 
It is no coincidence that President Putin’s pri-
ority political project, the Eurasian Economic 
Union, is being built on the foundation pro-
vided by this cultural core (which currently in-
cludes Russia and Belarus, with Kazakhstan as 
an addition)4. Putin himself has made it clear 
that it is not merely an economic, or even a po-
litical project, but a civilisational undertaking. 
He said: “The Eurasian Union is a project for 
maintaining the identity of nations in the his-
torical Eurasian space in a new century and in 
a new world”. [Putin, Valdai 2013]. 
The identity of this integrating post-Soviet space 
is to be based on a presumed special spiritual 
and civilisational community, referred to as 
the ‘Russian world’ (Russkiy mir). The term has 
several meanings in Russian discourse. It is usu-
ally defined, by President Putin himself also, as 
the community of Russian-speaking people cen-
2 President Putin’s meeting with members of the Val-
dai Club on 19 September 2013, http://eng.kremlin.ru/
news/6007 [further in this text: Putin, Valdai 2013].
3 Interview with Vladimir Putin for the documentary film 
The Second Baptism of Rus, 23 July 2013, http://eng.
kremlin.ru/transcripts/5747
4 For more information see Iwona Wiśniewska, ‘Eurasian 
integration. Russia’s attempt at the economic unifica-
tion of the post-Soviet area’, OSW Studies 44, Warsaw, 
July 2013, http://www.osw.waw.pl/sites/default/files/
prace_44_eurasian-integration_net.pdf 
tred around Russia5, who identify with the Or-
thodox Christian religion and culture6 and who 
cherish the same shared values, irrespective of 
their citizenship and ethnic background7. The 
Russian-Ukrainian community therefore consti-
tutes the core of the Russian World, all the Rus-
sian-speaking communities in the post-Soviet 
area make up its basic area, and in the broadest 
sense, the term encompasses people around 
the world who meet these three criteria. 
2. A US-led Western conspiracy 
If there exists a positive community with 
Russia in the centre, there must also exist its 
anti-thesis, an enemy intent on preventing the 
Russian World from attaining its unity. That en-
emy is the West, whose moral decline President 
Putin vividly described in his address to the Val-
dai Club [Putin, Valdai 2013].
Even though Russia has friends (persons rather 
than states) and partners in the Western world, 
the Kremlin perceives the West as fundamental-
ly anti-Russian because of the leading role that 
the United States plays in the Western communi-
ty. For years, it has been a standard practice for 
the Russian leadership, and especially President 
Putin, to lace their rhetoric with accusations 
against the West, and especially the United 
States, and to allege that they routinely violate 
international laws, employ a policy of force, and 
pursue an effectively neo-colonial approach in 
order to strengthen their geopolitical position. 
The Ukrainian crisis seems to have elevated this 
rhetoric to an entirely new level. President Pu-
tin has unequivocally accused the West, and 
5 President Putin’s reception to mark National Unity Day, 
4 November 2013, http://eng.kremlin.ru/news/6216 
6 Meeting with delegates to the Bishops’ Council, 1 Febru-
ary 2013 r., http://eng.kremlin.ru/transcripts/4926; Inter-
view with Vladimir Putin for the documentary film The 
Second Baptism of Rus, op.cit.
7 Putin elaborated on the concept of the Russian civil-
isational community based, inter alia, on common set 
of shared values, in his programmatic text on national 
policy: V. Putin, ‘Rossija – natsyonalnyi vopros’, Neza-
visimaya Gazeta, 23 January 2012, http://www.ng.ru/
politics/2012-01-23/1_national.html 
According to Putin, Russia is the centre of 
a civilisation, the Russian World. A Rus-
sian-Ukrainian-Belarusian community is 
at the core of this world, and its principal 
area encompasses the post-Soviet space 
inhabited by Russian-speaking people.
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especially the United States and its backers, of 
having sponsored a Ukrainian coup d’état (as 
the Ukrainian revolution is referred to in the 
Kremlin’s rhetoric), the preparations for which 
(including the training of militants) took place 
“at special bases in neighbouring states: in Lith-
uania, Poland and in Ukraine itself too”8. It has 
also been claimed without any ambiguity that 
the US-led Western conspiracy in Ukraine was 
in fact only one link in a whole chain of events. 
Putin elaborated on this claim in his address of 
18 March when he said: “There was a whole 
series of controlled “colour” revolutions”, re-
ferring both to the post-Soviet area (including 
Ukraine in 2004), and North Africa and the Mid-
dle East since 2011.
On the same occasion Putin also clearly stated 
that the social engineering employed by the 
West in the course of the current crisis was 
directed against Ukraine, Russia “and against 
Eurasian integration”. Moreover, the present 
situation was part of a long track record of an-
ti-Russian Western policies aimed at the con-
tainment of Russia, which have been in place 
since the eighteenth century. It is therefore not 
surprising that faced with such an act of ‘ag-
gression’ (”crossing the line”, in Putin’s words) 
on the part of the West – which, according to 
Putin’s warnings, was intent on using a “fifth 
column” in Russia in an effort to destabilise the 
country socially and economically – Moscow 
had to react because “Russia found itself in 
a position it could not retreat from”. 
II. Principles of Russia’s policy
Statements by Russian officials, and especially 
those by President Putin, not only offer a diag-
nosis, but also provide information about the 
guidelines and principles which Russia should 
follow in its foreign and security policy. 
8 President Putin’s press conference, 4 March 2014, 
http://eng.kremlin.ru/news/6763 [further in this 
text: Putin, 4 March].
1. Russia as the guarantor and defender 
of the rights of Russian-speaking people
Many comments made on the situation in 
Ukraine have referred to the alleged serious 
threats faced by Russian-speaking people in 
that country. It is notable that Russia has been 
invoking the Russian citizenship of those al-
legedly under threat less and less frequently; 
in contrast, it has increasingly been referring to 
a broader category encompassing inhabitants 
and citizens of Ukraine, including both Rus-
sians and Ukrainians [cf. Putin, 4 March]. This 
has been followed by steadfast pledges that 
Russia is prepared to defend this category of 
people: “Millions of Russians [Russkikh lyudei] 
and Russian-speaking people live in Ukraine 
and will continue to do so. Russia will always 
defend their interests using political, diplomat-
ic and legal means.” [Putin, 18 March]. There is 
no reason to believe that the above declaration 
applies to Ukraine only; there is no doubt that 
it also refers to the entire Russian World, includ-
ing the post-Soviet area in particular. 
2. ”Good neighbourly relations” as 
a precondition of Moscow’s recognition 
of independence and territorial integrity 
The statements President Putin has made 
during the Ukrainian crisis have contained 
many, often controversial, claims about the his-
tory of Ukraine. Some of them have unequiv-
ocally called into question the legitimacy of 
Ukraine’s current borders. This does not apply 
only to Crimea, in relation to which President 
Putin believes that the West, with the 
United States at the helm, is Russia’s en-
emy and has long been involved in a con-
spiracy to undermine Russia’s aspirations 
to restore the unity of the Russian World.
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Putin directly challenged the legality of its in-
corporation into Ukraine in 1954 by a decision 
of the then Soviet leadership (claiming the de-
cision had been taken “in clear violation of the 
constitutional norms that were in place even 
then”, behind the scenes and without asking 
the opinion of the people of Crimea). Putin 
has also implicitly called into doubt the legiti-
macy and justness of the incorporation of the 
lands which today constitute Ukraine’s south-
ern and eastern regions into the emerging 
Soviet Ukrainian republic in the early 1920s9. 
President Putin has gone even further than that 
in his thoughts. He has suggested that perhaps 
the Ukrainian state should be deemed to have 
ceased to exist, and therefore all treaties signed 
with it (including the base treaty of 1997, which 
recognised Ukraine’s territorial integrity) should 
be deemed invalid10.
Both claims, along with the dramatic descrip-
tions of the alleged chaos and violence reigning 
in Ukraine which Putin and other Russian officials 
have been quoting recently, could lead observers 
to the conclusion that independent Ukraine is in 
effect a ‘seasonal state’, a ‘whim of history’, which 
is what Putin had already hinted at during his ad-
9 “After the revolution, the Bolsheviks, for a number of 
reasons – may God judge them – added large sections of 
the historical south of Russia to the Republic of Ukraine 
[USSR]. This was done with no consideration for the eth-
nic make-up of the population, and today these areas 
form the south-east of Ukraine.” [Putin, 18 March].
10 “Yes, but if this is revolution, what does this mean? 
In such a case it is hard not to agree with some of our 
experts who say that a new state is now emerging in 
this territory. This is just like what happened when the 
Russian Empire collapsed after the 1917 revolution and 
a new state emerged. And this would be a new state 
with which we have signed no binding agreements.” 
[Putin, 4 March].
dress to the NATO summit in Bucharest in April 
200811.However, President Putin has left some 
hope for Ukraine’s survival. In his broad historical 
discourse he has implied that Russia always sup-
ported Ukraine and sought to meet its needs, and 
even gave it parts of its own territory (Crimea), 
when Ukraine was part of a bigger state together 
with Russia (the USSR), or at least there was still 
hope that the two countries could maintain close 
brotherly relations (after the USSR broke up and 
the Commonwealth of Independent States was 
created)12. 
This leads to a conclusion which apparently 
applies not only to Ukraine, but expresses 
a broader rule addressed to all the post- 
-Soviet states: Moscow will recognise their 
independence and territorial integrity only 
if they pursue a policy of “good neighbourly 
relations” with Russia. 
A careful analysis of President Putin’s state-
ments, together with the documents and ac-
tions of Russian diplomacy in recent months 
and years, provides some indications as to what 
such a policy should mean in practice. Its basic 
conditions seem to be the following:
• The given state must not participate in 
integration processes alternative to the 
structures controlled by Russia (be they po-
litical, economic or military), and certainly not 
in Western integration structures (the Europe-
an Union and especially NATO)13. This is related 
11 President Putin argued on that occasion that present-day 
Ukraine was a conglomerate of various territories be-
longing to its neighbours; he also argued that as its 
inhabitants were mostly Russians and Russian-speaking 
people, its aspirations to integration with NATO could 
threaten its territorial integrity. See Vladimir Putin’s ad-
dress at the NATO summit in Bucharest, 4 April 2008, 
http://www.unian.info/world/111033-text-of-putins-
speech-at-nato-summit-bucharest-april-2-2008.html
12  Cf. Putin, 18 March; Putin, Valdai 2013.
13 “We are against having a military alliance [NATO] making 
itself at home right in our backyard or in our historic territo-
ry.” [Putin 18 March] The condition of broadly understood 
neutralisation of Ukraine is also laid down in a draft docu-
ment handed over by the Russian Foreign Minister Sergei 
Lavrov to the US Secretary of State John Kerry in London on 
14 March 2014. See the statement by the Ministry of For-
eign Affairs of the Russian Federation on the support group 
for Ukraine, 17 March 2014, http://www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/
newsline/49766426492B6E9644257C9E0036B79A
Moscow is prepared to recognise the inde-
pendence and territorial integrity of post- 
-Soviet states only on the condition that they 
pursue a policy of “good neighbourly rela-
tions”, meaning in fact limited sovereignty.
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to an implicit broader condition: that the giv-
en state should not permit, without Russia’s 
consent, any non-Russian military presence on 
its territory (and certainly no Western military 
presence), and should not participate in any bi-
lateral or multilateral projects of political, eco-
nomic or military co-operation if they infringe 
the interests of the Russian Federation;
• The given state should fully respect the po-
litical and cultural rights of its Russian-speak-
ing inhabitants (especially ethnic Russians and 
Russian citizens, but not only)14. Naturally, it is 
up to Russia to determine the legitimate scope 
of such rights and assess if they are being re-
spected; 
• The given state should participate in the 
process of close political and economic Eur-
asian integration, as dictated and controlled 
by Moscow (through membership in the Eur-
asian Economic Union), if its participation is in 
line with Russia’s interests [Putin, Valdai 2013]. 
It should also implement bilateral and multilat-
eral co-operation projects that further Russia’s 
interests; this implicitly means that the state 
should reject development models based on 
European standards and stick with the post-So-
viet model. 
3. National interest, truth and justice 
above the law
The Russian Federation had employed interna-
tional law as its weapon in the political game 
with the West. Hitherto Moscow had steadfastly 
and strictly defended such principles as the non-
use of force against other countries without a UN 
Security Council mandate (Moscow justified its 
attack on Georgia in August 2008 by claiming 
it was applying its right to self-defence), or the 
respect for territorial integrity of states (its own 
recognition of Georgia’s breakaway regions of 
14 “But it should be above all in Ukraine’s own interest to 
ensure that these people’s rights and interests are fully 
protected. This is the guarantee of Ukraine’s state stabil-
ity and territorial integrity.” [Putin, 18 March]. 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia in August 2008 was 
explained as an exceptional situation in reac-
tion to ‘Georgian aggression’). Russia had con-
demned the Western states, especially the USA, 
on many occasions in the past for alleged sys-
tematic violations of those and other principles 
of international law (for example, it condemned 
the recognition of Kosovo’s independence by 
some Western states in 2009). 
Now, however, President Putin has pointed to 
examples of Western powers using force (es-
pecially the US operations, but also the French 
military interventions in Africa) to argue the 
case for Russia’s right to take similar actions in 
the context of the Ukrainian crisis. 
It is also notable that Moscow has recently be-
come increasingly disinclined to refer to the 
principles of international law to justify its ac-
tions towards Ukraine. It is true that Russian di-
plomacy and President Putin have been invok-
ing the alleged request from (former) President 
Yanukovych to justify the armed intervention 
in Ukraine, and have been presenting the an-
nexation of Crimea as a realisation of the “right 
of nations to self-determination”. However, in 
neither case have they cared much about main-
taining the appearances of legality and purity 
of procedures. 
Moreover, President Putin’s rhetoric now 
strongly relies on extralegal arguments to jus-
tify Russia’s policy, such as references to truth, 
justice, national interest and the will of the na-
tion, which hitherto had hardly been present 
Russia is currently putting national inter-
est and a sense of justice above the rules 
of international law, and is prepared to 
resort to military force under the pretext 
of defending the Russian-speaking popu-
lations in the post-Soviet area.
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in his discourse15. This means that, given the 
weakness of Moscow’s legal arguments and 
the case for its actions under international law, 
it has chosen to place what could be described 
as unwritten principles of legitimacy and justice 
associated with specifically defined national in-
terests above those of the law.
4. Use of force as a legitimate way 
to defend compatriots
Ever since the Russian Federation was estab-
lished, one of its declared priorities has been to 
defend the Russian (or Russian-speaking) pop-
ulations abroad, especially in the post-Soviet 
area. However, before now Moscow had avoid-
ed making a clear statement of the rules that 
would govern the use of military force to this 
end. It is worth remembering that the attack by 
Russian troops on Georgia in August 2008 was 
formally justified as a reaction to the firing of 
shots at Russian peacekeepers in South Ossetia. 
However, recent statements by President Putin 
and some Russian publications clearly suggest 
that Moscow is now claiming the right to use 
military force for the declared purpose of de-
15 For instance, speaking about Crimea after 1954, Putin 
said on 18 March: “In people’s hearts and minds, Crimea 
has always been an inseparable part of Russia. This firm 
conviction is based on truth and justice (…) This country 
was going through such hard times then that realistically 
it was incapable of protecting its interests. However, 
the people could not reconcile themselves to this out-
rageous historical injustice.” And when justifying the 
decision to annex Crimea, Putin said: “Now this is a mat-
ter for Russia’s own political decision, and any decision 
here can be based only on the people’s will, because 
the people are the ultimate source of all authority.” 
fending Russian-speaking people outside Rus-
sia16. Those statements and documents imply 
that there are two principal, interrelated im-
plicit criteria for any decision to use military 
force: 
• the existence, according to Russia, of a seri-
ous threat to the security (especially life and 
physical well-being) of Russian-speaking 
people (Russian citizens and/or compatriots17 
and/or Russian soldiers stationed abroad)18;
• a request for assistance made by such peo-
ple to Russia (there are no detailed conditions 
for such requests). 
Another criterion, that of a request for assis-
tance made by the legal government of the 
given state, may serve as an additional argu-
ment to legitimise such action for the interna-
tional community (as Putin himself suggested 
in March), but this does not necessarily need 
to be met for Russia to use force. The use of 
military force will therefore be based on two 
premises: the obligation to offer assistance to 
compatriots, and the need to act in line with 
Russia’s national interest. [Putin, 4 March].
16 As President Putin said on 4 March in reply to a ques-
tion about the use of Russian armed forces in Ukraine: 
“Therefore, if we see such uncontrolled crime spreading 
to the eastern regions of the country, and if the people 
ask us for help, while we already have the official re-
quest from the legitimate President, we retain the right 
to use all available means to protect those people. We 
believe this would be absolutely legitimate. This is our 
last resort.” [Putin, 4 March]. 
17 The term ‘compatriot’ (sootechestvennik) has a broad 
definition in Russia. Under the Law of 24 May 1999 on 
the state policy of the Russian Federation towards com-
patriots abroad, it includes (in slightly simplified terms): 
Russian citizens living abroad and former citizens, or de-
scendants of citizens, of the Soviet Union, the Russian 
Republic and the Russian Empire.
18 “However, we cannot remain indifferent if we see that they 
are being persecuted, destroyed and humiliated.” [Putin, 
4 March]. A “threat to life” was also directly mentioned 
in President Putin’s request to the Federation Council for 
endorsement of the use of Russian armed forces on the 
territory of Ukraine; that request also mentioned the three 
previously mentioned categories of people under threat. 
See ‘Vladimir Putin appeals to the Federation Council’, 
1 March 2014, http://kremlin.ru/news/20353. On the oth-
er hand, the alleged request by the (former) President of 
Ukraine Viktor Yanukovych to send in troops refers to the 
need to protect “the life, health and freedom” of the citi-
zens of Ukraine. Cf. Putin, 4 March.
The Putin doctrine provides a justifica-
tion for efforts to restore the unity of the 
‘Russian nation’ through Eurasian in-
tegration or even through the creation 
of a single state spanning at least a part 
of the post-Soviet area.
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III. Outlook for the future: the unifica-
tion of the ‘Russian nation’?
Moscow considers Ukraine to be a priority 
country, and believes that the Western world’s 
stance towards Kyiv crossed a ‘red line’. At the 
same time, the Russian leadership is convinced 
that the West is strategically weak and divided 
and lacks determination, and Moscow has thus 
decided to challenge it. The general objective is 
to largely undo the order that has existed since 
the end of the Cold War, which in Moscow’s 
view has been based on the West’s exploitation 
of Russia’s weaknesses for geopolitical gain. 
Today Russia believes in its power and deter-
mination, and is seeking to reclaim as much as 
possible of what it has lost, unjustly in its own 
opinion. Its aim is therefore to establish a new 
political, economic and security order in Europe 
(or more broadly, in northern Eurasia). This new 
order should be based on Russian-defined, ef-
fectively post-Soviet standards, as an alterna-
tive to European standards. Russia’s first and 
main task is to regain strategic control of the 
post-Soviet area (for the time being, probably 
excluding the Baltic states), establish a sphere 
of exclusive Russian influence in that area, and 
force the West to accept this new status quo. In 
this context, however, it is not fully clear how 
one should interpret President Putin’s sugges-
tions about the annexation of Crimea as an ele-
ment of a process of restoring the unity of the 
Russian nation, which so far remains divided, as 
the German nation used to be: “I expect that 
the citizens of Germany will also support the 
aspiration of the Russians, of historical Rus-
sia, to restore unity.” [Putin, 18 March]
In a maximalist interpretation, this could be 
seen as a project to rebuild Russian state-
hood within the borders of the former USSR 
(possibly without the Baltic states), or spanning 
only Russia, Belarus and Ukraine19. In the mini-
malist version, it could be a plan to transform 
the Eurasian Economic Union (which should 
also incorporate Ukraine, or at least its southern 
and eastern regions, as well as Moldova, or at 
least Transnistria, and Georgia, or just Abkhazia 
and South Ossetia) into a tight economic bloc 
that would partly resemble the European Union 
in form, but would pursue a development 
model different from the Western one. Ei-
ther way, taking strategic control over Ukraine 
is crucial for the success of Russia’s plans20.
19 This is a possible interpretation of the following state-
ment by Putin: “At the foundations of the Russian nation 
and the centralised Russian state are the same spiritual 
values that unite the whole of that part of Europe now 
shared by Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus. This is our com-
mon spiritual, moral and values space, and this plays 
a very big part in uniting the people.” Interview with 
Vladimir Putin for the documentary film The Second 
Baptism of Rus, op. cit. 
20 Cf. the statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
of the Russian Federation on the support group for 
Ukraine, op. cit. The document effectively envisages the 
creation of a Russian protectorate in Ukraine, with for-
mal legal and international guarantees. 
